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
 
 
 
India has not acceded to either the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. 
The admission and protection of refugees in India continues to be controlled by the 1946 
Foreigners Act, which gives the state sweeping powers to detain and expel all foreigners in 
India. India is bound by a wide range of general human rights and customary norms that 
combine to produce a broad norm prohibiting forced return (refoulement). Yet, no provision 
is made in the domestic law of India to protect displaced persons from refoulement. Efforts to 
introduce a comprehensive refugee law that would provide for such protections have been 
consistently defeated following objections from the Indian security and intelligence agencies. 
 
In this paper, I consider the current position of India in light of its domestic legal 
regime, its membership of the UNHCR Executive Committee (ExCom), and the limitations it 
continues to impose as a matter of policy on UNHCR operations in the country. I describe the 
standards applied in the admission and protection of refugees in India, with a particular focus 
on Tibetan and Sri Lankan refugees. While Indian admission and protection policies have 
often been quite generous, they are also obviously unequal, with standards among refugee 
communities varying widely according to ethnicity, country of origin, and date of arrival. I 
explain the international standards that control in this matter and, in particular, argue that 
both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
Convention against Torture (CAT) each carry obligations of non-refoulement for India. This 
is in addition to the well-established obligations of non-refoulement imposed by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). 
 
Finally, I argue that the various norms relevant to the issue of non-refoulement in both 
the refugee law and human rights context, although superficially disparate, have now largely 
converged. As such, a standard rule can now be construed that forbids India from returning 
individuals to situations where there is a real risk of serious human rights violations. This 
norm is non-derogable and can be properly evaluated only with respect to the seriousness of 
any potential violation, and not the category of the rights concerned.  
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 1. Introduction: The Ambiguous Position of India 
 
 
The Republic of India maintains a deeply ambiguous position with respect to the 
protection of refugees and asylum-seekers. India has not yet signed or ratified either the 1951 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter 1951 Geneva Convention, 
1951 Convention or Refugee Convention)
1
 or its 1967 Protocol.
2
 Moreover, and despite very 
significant numbers of displaced persons entering India since independence, no provision is 
made in the domestic law of India for refugees or asylum-seekers. The 1946 Foreigners Act 
defines a “foreigner” as anyone who is “not a citizen of India”3 and makes sweeping 
provision for orders restricting their entry,
4
 exit,
5
 place of residence within India,
6
 and 
personal associations,
7
 as well as ultimately, for their arrest and detention.
8
 The Citizenship 
                                               
1
 See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2&chapter=5&Temp=mt
dsg2&lang=en (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) for a current list of signatories and parties to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
2
 See Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=V-
5&chapter=5&lang=en#Participants (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) for a current list of signatories and parties to the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.  
3
 Foreigners Act, No. 31 of 1946, § 2(a), INDIA CODE (2014) [hereinafter Foreigners Act], available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in. 
4
 Id. § 3(1)(a); Foreigners Order, 1948, No. 9/9/46-Political (EW), Gazette of India, pt. I, sec. 1, at 198, § 3(1)(a) 
(Feb. 14, 1948) [hereinafter Foreigners Order]. 
5
 Foreigners Act, supra note 3, § 3(2)(b); Foreigners Order, supra note 4, § 5(1)(a). 
6
 Foreigners Act, supra note 3, § 3(2)(e)(i); Foreigners Order, supra note 4, § 11; cf. Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, arts. 26, 31(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
7
 Foreigners Act, supra note 3, § 3(1)(e)(ii). 
8
 Foreigners Act, supra note 3, § 3(1)(g). 
3 
Act 1955 (as amended) defines all foreigners who enter India without valid travel documents 
as “illegal migrants.”9  
 
Neither Act provides for the entry or non-refoulement of asylum-seekers or refugees. 
For the purposes of Indian law, asylum-seekers are merely one variety of foreigner and 
subject to the same sweeping powers regulating their entry and removal from the country. 
Moreover, and despite acceding to membership of the UNHCR Executive Committee 
(ExCom) in 1995, India has almost entirely restricted UNHCR operations in the country to 
their main office in New Delhi. Asylum-seekers who wish to apply for refugee status from 
UNHCR pursuant to its own mandate (“mandate refugee status”) or material assistance must 
travel to New Delhi in order to contact UNHCR directly. This, in turn, has acted as a 
powerful incentive for refugees to relocate to New Delhi and so contributed to the growing 
population of urban refugees in the capital.
10
  
 
It may appear, therefore, as if the entry and protection policies of India in respect to 
persons seeking international protection (both asylum-seekers and those seeking alternative 
forms of complementary or subsidiary protection) remain wholly discretionary. However, 
this paper will argue that, notwithstanding India’s continuing failure to accede to the 
principle international instruments for the protection of refugees (the 1951 Convention and its 
Protocol), it is now bound by a rich complex of international human rights norms that 
combine to significantly constrain its discretion with respect to the treatment of foreign 
nationals and, in particular, its obligations in respect of non-refoulement. These obligations 
begin with the widely accepted guarantees against refoulement found in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC). Perhaps more surprisingly, these also include parallel guarantees against 
refoulement as found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) and in the Convention against Torture (CAT). India has not yet ratified the CAT, 
and so remains as only a signatory to this treaty. I rely on Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to argue that, given the central importance of the 
guarantee against refoulement to the object and purpose of the CAT, the prohibition of 
refoulement found in Article 3 of the CAT now binds India, notwithstanding its continuing 
failure to finally ratify this treaty. 
 
While these norms may appear superficially disparate, this paper will argue that, in 
fact, they have now converged sufficiently in international practice to permit the construction 
of a single “standard” rule with respect to non-refoulement as it applies to India. This is of 
particular significance for India as, in its capacity as a member of the UNHCR’s Executive 
Committee (ExCom) since 1995, it has now joined statements that find the guarantee of non-
refoulement to be a non-derogable or jus cogens norm. To the extent that these norms can be 
construed to ground a single or general rule against refoulement in the way that I suggest, it is 
                                               
9
 The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2004, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, § 2(1)(b), 2004 (India) [hereinafter 
Citizenship Act]; cf. Refugee Convention, supra note 6, sec. 31(1). 
10
 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Policy Dev. & Evaluation Serv., Destination Delhi: A Review of the 
Implementation of UNHCR’s Urban Refugee Policy in India’s Capital City, U.N. Doc. PDES/2013/09 (July 
2013) (by MaryBeth Morand & Jeff Crisp), available at http://www.unhcr.org/51f66e7d9.pdf; WOMEN’S 
REFUGEE COMM’N, BRIGHT LIGHTS, BIG CITY: URBAN REFUGEES STRUGGLE TO MAKE A LIVING IN NEW DELHI 
(2011), available at https://womensrefugeecommission.org/component/zdocs/document/733-bright-lights-big-
city-urban-refugees-struggle-to-make-a-living-in-new-delhi; Parveen Parmar, Emily Aaronson, Margeaux 
Fischer & Kelli N. O’Laughlin, Burmese Refugee Experience Accessing Health Care in New Delhi: A 
Qualitative Study, 33 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 1 (2014). 
4 
also a non-derogable one in both international practice and the now publicly stated view of 
the Indian state.  
 
Insofar as this paper provides a revised account of the extent of the non-refoulement 
obligations in the ICESCR and (with respect to signatory states) the CAT, it builds on the 
emerging body of literature addressing the complementary
11
 or subsidiary
12
 protection of 
refugees. However, it also seeks to engage with the practical detail of the admission and 
protection regime for persons seeking international protection in India, and the manner in 
which international standards can be incorporated and relied on at Indian law. As such, it 
aims to provide something like a comprehensive account of the role of international law in 
defining and controlling the protection of foreign nationals in India. In doing so, it seeks to 
go beyond a discussion of the legal standards per se, and afford a clear and accessible 
reference point for those advocates engaged in protection work on behalf of foreign nationals 
in India, either informally as part of the UN and non-governmental community, or in the 
context of litigation on behalf of such claimants at the international and the domestic Indian 
level. 
 
I begin in section two of this paper by setting out the broader context of refugee 
protection in India. This includes a brief discussion of the position at Indian constitutional 
law, the limitations imposed by the state on UNHCR operations in the country, and the 
significance of India’s accession to ExCom membership. I continue in section three to more 
specifically consider the position of individual refugee groups, with particular attention to the 
evolving status of the two largest and politically most significant groups, Tibetans and Sri 
Lankan Tamils. While the admission and protection policies adopted by the Indian state in 
respect to each community have frequently been extremely generous, they have also been 
notably uneven, with the model and degree of protection afforded to refugees varying 
dramatically according to their ethnicity, country of origin, and date of entry into India.  
 
Section four turns to a more general consideration of the position of refugees and 
other foreign nationals under international human rights law. I begin by explaining the most 
basic terms on which these conventions apply and note the obligation of states parties to 
secure the rights in the respective conventions to everyone in their territory or jurisdiction 
without discrimination. I discuss the degree to which these conventions apply in parallel with 
the Refugee Convention and note some key areas where foreign nationals are excluded from 
protection under these instruments. 
                                               
11
 See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Policy Dev. & Evaluation Serv., New Issues In Refugee Research, 
Research Paper No. 238, Filling the Protection Gap: Current Trends in Complementary Protection in Canada, 
Mexico and Australia (May 2012) (by Nicole Dicker & Joanna Mansfield), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4fc872719.pdf; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Dep’t Of Int’l Prot., Prot. Policy & 
Legal Advice Section, Legal And Protection Policy Research Series: Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 
1951 Convention (“Complementary Protection”), U.N. Doc. PPLA/2005/02 (June 2005) (by Ruma Mandal), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/435df0aa2.html; JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (2007). 
12
 Council Directive 2004/83, of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third 
Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection 
and the Content of the Protection Granted, art. 15, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 19 (EC) [hereinafter Qualification 
Directive]; Directive 2011/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International 
Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the 
Content of the Protection Granted (Recast), art. 15, 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, 18 (EU) [hereinafter Qualification 
Directive Recast]. 
5 
 
Section five provides a detailed discussion of the terms of non-refoulement under 
international human rights law. I describe the breadth of this norm under the key conventions 
relevant to India and the now well-recognized prohibition of refoulement under the ICCPR 
and the CRC. However, I also argue that the prohibition of refoulement found in the CAT 
now applies with respect to India, despite India remaining only a signatory to the Convention, 
and that the ICESCR should now be read to impose an obligation of non-refoulement similar 
to the one found in the ICCPR. I conclude with a re-evaluation of the parallel norm of non-
refoulement at customary international law and a new account of the position of the Indian 
state with respect to the non-derogability of this norm.  
 
Finally, in section six, I argue that, as a result of the degree to which the concept of 
“persecution” in refugee law now relies on the corpus of international human rights law to 
define its content and terms, the various norms that provide for the right of non-refoulement 
in the refugee and human rights law context have now largely converged. On this basis, a 
new consolidated rule can be construed that forbids India from returning individuals to 
situations where there is a real risk of serious human rights violations. This norm is non-
derogable and can be properly evaluated only with respect to the seriousness of any potential 
violation and not the category of the rights concerned. It is thus a qualitative, rather than a 
categorical, determination.  
 
 
2. Refugees in Indian Law 
 
While India has neither acceded to the 1951 Convention nor introduced a domestic 
regime for the protection of refugees, this is not to say that there have not been any attempts 
to revise Indian immigration law so as to make appropriate provision. In 1995, a drafting 
committee led by Justice P. N. Bhagwati, a former Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court, 
prepared a model law on asylum-seekers and refugees under the auspices of the Regional 
Consultations on Refugees and Migratory Movements in South Asia Initiative.
13
 The model 
law was substantially revised in 2006, as the Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Protection) Bill 
by the Public Interest Legal Support and Research Centre.
14
 While the definition of a refugee 
in the revised bill remained the same, the new draft dropped many of the rights included in 
Article 13 of the original model law in order to accommodate objections from the intelligence 
and security establishment.
15
 The rights dropped included the right of a refugee to choose 
their place of residence and to move freely within the country, the right to adequate housing, 
healthcare and primary education, and the right to freely access employment.
16
 However, 
these changes were insufficient to overcome the objections of the security establishment.
17
 
                                               
13
 Model National Law on Refugees, 1 ISIL Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN & REFUGEE L. 295 (2001); ARJUN NAIR, 
IPCS RESEARCH PAPERS NO. 11, NATIONAL REFUGEE LAW FOR INDIA: BENEFITS AND ROADBLOCKS 1, 2 n.7 
(2007), available at http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/51462796IPCS-ResearchPaper11-ArjunNair.pdf. 
14
 Nita Bhalla, Lack of India Refugee Law Leaves Many in Limbo, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Mar. 25, 2010, 
17:24 GMT), http://www.trust.org/item/20100325172400-d70r9/. 
15
 Home Ministry’s Refugee Bill Worries Security Agencies, REDIFF NEWS (Oct. 19, 2009, 14:52 IST), 
http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/oct/19/home-ministrys-refugee-bill-worries-security-agencies.htm. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Bhalla, supra note 14 (“Rights campaigners have for over a decade lobbied for a domestic law and two bills 
have been drafted - in 1997 and then in 2006 - but New Delhi has stalled on approving either of these bills, 
mainly due to security concerns. Sharing a massive porous border with many hostile neighbours and 
consistently threatened by external militancy, India does not want to be tied down by any legal obligation that 
impinges upon its discretion to regulate the entry of foreigners into its territory.”); Some Refugees are More 
Equal, TELEGRAPH (Calcutta), Dec. 26, 2012, 
6 
Ultimately, neither bill was successful in obtaining the support of the Indian Cabinet and they 
were not introduced before Parliament.
18
  
 
There is some scope for constitutional litigation on this issue. It is a well-established 
principle of Indian law that, in case of ambiguity or lacunae in the law, it is to be interpreted 
consistently with India’s obligations at international law.19 As the Indian Supreme Court 
explained in Tractor Export, Moscow v. M/S Tarapore & Co.: 
  
There is a presumption that Parliament does not assert or assume jurisdiction 
which goes beyond the limits established by the common consent of nations and 
statutes are to be interpreted provided that their language permits, so as not to be 
inconsistent with the comity of nations or with the established principles of 
International Law. But this principle applies only where there is an ambiguity and 
must give way before a clearly expressed intention.
20
 
 
In the case of Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, the Supreme Court again confirmed that 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution,
21
 the right to the protection of life and liberty, applies to 
foreign nationals.
22
 The obvious next step for the court would be to find that this Article 
prohibits the removal of foreign nationals to situations in which their life or liberty would be 
threatened. This would be consistent with India’s obligations at international law and faithful 
to the substance of the Article itself. 
 
In partial reliance on De Raedt, the Supreme Court has subsequently been asked on at 
least two occasions to rule on the forced displacement of foreign nationals in India. In the 
case of State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Khudiram Chakma,
23
 the state government of 
Arunachal Pradesh had ordered the forced relocation of a group of Chakma families that 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121226/jsp/opinion/story_16361434.jsp (“Security forces argued that this 
would pose a danger to national security as India shares porous borders with neighbouring countries. ‘This 
provision would have allowed illegal migrants to come to India under the garb of a refugee’, says a Border 
Security Force official.”). 
18
 Anna-Sophie Bentz, Afghan Refugees in Indo-Afghan Relations, 26 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 374, 381 
(2013); Partha S. Ghosh, South Asia’s Response to its Refugee Questions, in POLITICS IN SOUTH ASIA: CULTURE 
RATIONALITY AND CONCEPTUAL FLOW 101, 119 (Siegfried O. Wolf, Jivanta Schöttli, Dominik Frommherz, Kai 
Fürsteberg, Marian Gallenkamp, Lion König & Markus Pauli eds., 2015); Vijay Prashad, Uprooted and Lost on 
Strange Soil, TELEGRAPH (Calcutta), May 1, 2014, 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140501/jsp/opinion/story_18290616.jsp; State v. Chandra Kumar, FIR No. 
78/10, paras. 78–79 (Del. Dist. M.M.C. Sept. 20, 2011) (India), printed in REFUGEES AND THE LAW 525, 546 
(Ragini Trakroo Zutshi, Jayshree Satpute & Md. Saood Tahir eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
19
 Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 664, 673–75 (India); Tractor 
Exp., Moscow v. M/S Tarapore & Co., (1970) 3 S.C.R. 53, 64 (1969) (India); ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, 
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 142 (2011). 
20
 Tractor Exp., (1970) 3 S.C.R. at 64. 
21
 INDIA CONST. art. 21 (“Protection of life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”). 
22
 Louis De Raedt v. Union Of India,(1991) 3 S.C.R. 554, para. 13 (India) (“The fundamental right of the 
foreigner is confined to Article 21 for life and liberty and does not include the right to reside and settle in this 
country as mentioned in Article 19(1)(e), which is applicable only to the citizens of this country.”); Hans Muller 
of Nuremburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail Calcutta, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1284, 1298 (India); B.S. Chimni, 
The Legal Condition of Refugees in India, 7 J. REFUGEE STUD. 378, 380 (1994). 
23
 State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Khudiram Chakma and Khudiram Chakma v. State of Arunachal, (1994 Supp.) 
1 S.C.C. 615 (1993) (India). 
7 
originated from the former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
24
 and had settled within the so-
called inner line, a “protected area” for purposes of the Foreigners (Protected Areas) Order 
1958.
25
 Their settlement in the area was deemed illegal and their claim to be citizens of India 
(and resulting entitlement to enhanced constitutional protection) was rejected.
26
 As such, the 
court was unwilling to intervene to prevent their forced removal by the state government.
27
 
 
In the slightly later case of National Human Rights Commission v. State Of Arunachal 
Pradesh & Others, the Supreme Court was asked to make an order to protect the Article 21 
rights of a large group (approximately 65,000) of Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh.
28
 They 
feared continuing violence and harassment led by a student group, the All Arunachal Pradesh 
Students Union, that sought the expulsion of all “foreigners” from the state.29 While the court 
made an order for their physical protection, it is notable that this was made with respect to a 
non-state actor, and not directed toward the state (either Arunachal Pradesh or the Union of 
India itself).
30
 While the court also ordered the State of Arunachal Pradesh to refrain from 
removing any of the individuals concerned, this was done on the understanding that they 
were in the process of applying for Indian citizenship.
31
 The order itself was limited to the 
period “while the application of any individual Chakma is pending consideration.”32 
 
It is unclear from the facts of each case whether the Chakma facing removal from 
their homes in Arunachal Pradesh would have ultimately faced removal from India. 
Nevertheless, in each case the Supreme Court had the opportunity to confirm that Article 21 
of the Indian Constitution granted a right against forced removal in situations where an 
individual’s life or freedom would be threatened, and signally failed to do so. As such, the 
position in Indian law with respect to the protection of foreigners from forced displacement 
remains very largely as was described by the court in the 1955 case of Hans Muller Of 
Nuremburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail Calcutta and Others: 
 
                                               
24
 Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury, Uprooted Twice: Refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, in REFUGEES 
AND THE STATE: PRACTICES OF ASYLUM AND CARE IN INDIA, 1947-2000, at 249 (Ranabir Samaddar ed., 2003) 
[hereinafter REFUGEES AND THE STATE]. 
25
 Foreigners (Protected Areas) Order, 1958, G.S.R. 713, Gazette of India, pt. II, sec. 3, subsec. i, at 657 (Aug. 
23, 1958). 
26
 Chakma, (1994 Supp.) 1 S.C.C. 615, para. 63 (“Insofar as the appellants and the Chakmas were residing in 
Miao Sub-Division of Tirap District in Arunachal Pradesh long before 1985 they cannot be regarded at the 
citizens of India. We find it difficult to appreciate the argument of Mr. Gobinda Mukhoty, learned counsel, that 
the accident of the appellants living in Arunachal Pradesh should not deprive them of citizenship. In this 
connection, it is worthwhile to note that Section 6-A of the Citizenship Act come to be incorporated by 
Amending Act as a result of Assam Accord. If law lays down certain conditions for acquiring citizenship, we 
cannot disregard the law…”). 
27
 Chakma, (1994 Supp.) 1 S.C.C. 615, para. 74 (“Even then what is that is sought to be done to the appellants? 
They are asked to settle in Maitripur and Gautampur villages from Miao. Certainly setting the Chakmas in a 
particular place is a matter of policy. This Court cannot enter into the wisdom of such a policy, in view of what 
has been stated above, Arunachal Pradesh is strategically important with Bhutan in the West, Tibet and China in 
the North and North-East, Burma (Myanmar) in the East.”). 
28
 Nat’l Human Rights Comm’n v. State Of Arunachal Pradesh, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 742 (India). 
29
 Id., paras. 3–6. 
30
 Id. para. 21(3) (“The quit notices and ultimatums issued by the AAPSU and any other group which 
tantamount to threats to the life and liberty of each and every Chakma should be dealt with by the first 
respondent in accordance with law;”). 
31
 Id. para. 21(5) (“While the application of any individual Chakma is pending consideration, the first 
respondent shall not evict or remove the person concerned from his occupation on the ground that he is not a 
citizen of India until the competent authority has taken a decision in that behalf;”). 
32
 Id. 
8 
The Foreigners Act confers the power to expel foreigners from India. It vests the 
Central Government with absolute and unfettered discretion and, as there is no 
provision fettering this discretion in the Constitution, an unrestricted right to expel 
remains.
33
  
 
2.1 Limitations on UNHCR Operations in India 
 
Given the absence of a domestic legal regime for the protection of refugees, it might 
be expected that the government would encourage the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) to extend their own operations throughout the country. In fact, the 
government has been unwilling to settle a co-operation agreement with UNHCR.
34
 Without a 
country agreement or memorandum of understanding with the government of India, UNHCR 
has no formal status in the country and continues to operate under the auspices of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
35
 In practice, UNHCR operations are restricted 
by the government, which generally only permits UNHCR to provide assistance to asylum-
seekers and refugees from non-contiguous states.
36
  
 
UNHCR is permitted to maintain an office in New Delhi (styled a Mission rather 
than, as one might expect, a Branch Office) and a small Field Office in Chennai in Tamil 
Nadu state. The office in New Delhi is permitted to conduct refugee status determination 
(RSD) pursuant to the terms of the UNHCR statute for those asylum-seekers who are able to 
reach New Delhi.
37
 Those determined to be refugees by UNHCR pursuant to the terms of its 
statute are referred to as “mandate refugees.”38 However, UNHCR is forbidden from 
extending protection services to displaced persons resident outside of New Delhi. In 
particular, it is not permitted direct access to the Burmese Chin displaced persons in Mizoram 
state, to the numerous camps hosting Sri Lankans in Tamil Nadu, or to any of the Tibetan 
settlements spread throughout the country.
39
 As such, the UNHCR Field Office in Chennai is 
limited to providing repatriation assistance to Tamils it is able to interview outside of the 
camps and it relies on other NGOs/civil society organizations to inform it about conditions in 
the camps themselves.
40
  
 
2.2 ExCom Membership 
 
                                               
33
 Hans Muller, (1955) 1 S.C.R. at 1298. 
34
 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, COUNTRY OPERATIONS PLAN: INDIA 2006, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4332c6232.html; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & 
LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2013: INDIA 31 (2014), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220604.pdf. For an example of the UNHCR co-operation 
agreement, see U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Model UNHCR Co-operation Agreement: Agreement 
Between The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Government of ___, U.N. 
Doc. Rev. MNW 24/10/01 (2009), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b31b27.html. 
35
 See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, supra note 34; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 34, at 30. 
36
 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 34, at 27. 
37
 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428 (V), U.N. 
GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775, at 46 (Dec. 14, 1950) [hereinafter UNHCR Statute]. 
38
 See REFUGEES AND THE LAW, supra note 18, at 56–58, for a clear introduction to the position of mandate 
refugees in India. 
39
 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 34, at 30. 
40
 See Sri Lanka Minister Promises to Prioritize Tamil Repatriation in 2014, IRIN (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/98601/sri-lanka-minister-promises-to-prioritize-tamil-repatriation-in-2014; U.N. 
HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HELPING SRI LANKAN REFUGEES COME HOME (2013), available at 
http://unhcr.lk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/HELPING-SRI-LANKAN-REFUGEES-Leaflet.pdf. 
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In light of the continuing restrictions on UNHCR operations in the country it may be 
surprising to learn that, in fact, India has been a member of the Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner's Programme (ExCom) since 1995.
41
 ExCom was established in 1959 at 
the request of a UN General Assembly
42
 and by a resolution of the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC).
43
 The UNHCR statute requires it to follow the policy directives of the 
General Assembly or ECOSOC.
44
 ExCom does not replace the authority of the General 
Assembly or ECOSOC but, rather, has its own quite specific executive and advisory 
responsibilities.
45
  
 
It has been controversial among some lawyers whether the Conclusions of ExCom are 
binding on UNHCR without the further endorsement of the General Assembly.
46
 However, 
the UNHCR statute, itself a General Assembly Resolution, makes explicit the High 
Commissioner’s obligation to “follow policy directives given him by the General Assembly 
or the Economic and Social Council.”47 ECOSOC, in its Resolution 672 (XXV), instructs 
ExCom to “[d]etermine the general policies under which the High Commissioner shall plan, 
develop and administer the programmes and projects required.”48 The use of what seems 
plainly mandatory language by ECOSOC with respect to ExCom’s duties, combined with its 
mandate in the UNHCR statute to make policy directives, and the High Commissioner’s 
obligation to follow such directives, leaves little room for doubt that the conclusions of 
ExCom are binding on the High Commissioner.
49
 In short, the General Assembly has obliged 
the High Commissioner to follow the policy directives of ECOSOC, which, in turn, has 
instructed ExCom to determine such policies. Moreover, UNHCR itself has consistently 
accepted the binding nature of ExCom conclusions.
50
  
 
Membership in ExCom is not the equivalent of a de facto acceptance of the 
obligations of the 1951 Geneva Convention or its 1967 Protocol, and India has continued to 
act contrary to the standards of the 1951 Convention since its accession to membership in 
1995.
51
 Nevertheless, ExCom plays a significant role in setting UNHCR policy and, by 
extension, standards for international protection. It is difficult to interpret participation as a 
member of ExCom in the deliberation and agreement of such standards as anything other 
                                               
41
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 CORINNE LEWIS, UNHCR AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW: FROM TREATIES TO INNOVATION 51–54 
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46
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than the member state’s endorsement of the standards that result. Moreover, the key criterion 
for membership of ExCom is “a demonstrated interest in, and devotion to, the solution of the 
refugee problem.”52 By acceding to membership of ExCom, India has a made a powerful and 
quite public commitment to the development and propagation of improved standards for 
international protection.  
 
3. Admission and Protection Policies 
 
There is no question that India’s admission and protection policies since 
independence have been, on the whole, extremely generous.
53
 It currently hosts a 
considerable population of refugees and other displaced persons.
54
 As of January 2014, 
UNHCR estimated that there were a total of 197,850 refugees in the country.
55
 This number 
should include what the government estimates to be more than 100,000 ethnic Tamil Sri 
Lankans in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, with 68,000 living in the 112 government-run 
camps and a further 32,000 living outside of the camps in the surrounding area.
56
 The actual 
UNHCR estimate of ethnic Tamil Sri Lankans in Tamil Nadu is the considerably lower 
number of 65,674.
57
 Given the very slow pace of repatriation to Sri Lanka, however, 
UNHCR’s own numbers in this case seem unrealistically low.58 As UNHCR is unable to 
access the camps in Tamil Nadu directly, and so has been unable to register the refugees 
there, the government’s own numbers as to Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India are to be 
preferred. 
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A further 109,015 Tibetan refugees have now settled in a variety of locations around 
India,
59
 often on land ceded to them for this purpose by state authorities and administered 
through independent settlement corporations.
60
 This figure is included in the overall UNHCR 
estimate of 197,850 refugees in the country.
61
 It is estimated that a further 100,000 Burmese 
refugees of Chin ethnicity have now crossed into Mizoram State from Myanmar.
62
 Although 
UNHCR is unable to access Mizoram directly, approximately 13,860 Chin Burmese have 
now travelled to New Delhi to seek refugee status from the UNHCR office there.
63
 Of these, 
approximately 11,500 have now received mandate refugee status.
64
 These, in turn, must be 
distinguished from the Burmese Rohingya, of whom UNHCR in New Delhi has now 
registered some 5,500 as asylum-seekers.
65
 In 2012, Burmese Rohingya became eligible for 
Indian long-stay visas in India on the basis of their registration as asylum-seekers with 
UNHCR.
66
 A further 1,430 asylum-seekers and 11,650 mandate refugees from a wide range 
of countries are registered with UNHCR in New Delhi, of which the largest numbers, after 
the Burmese Chin, are from Afghanistan and Somalia.
67
  
 
While reports of border closures, push-backs, and arbitrary removals from Indian 
territory are easy to find,
68
 it is generally accepted that India has, on the whole, an admirable 
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record with respect to the admission and protection of refugees.
69
 Since 2012, India has 
begun to issue long-term visas to those recognised as mandate refugees, which should grant 
authorization to work and permit access to publicly-funded higher/tertiary education.
70
 In the 
absence of a legally enforceable right to refugee status in the domestic law of the state, 
however, such provision can only ever amount to a “regime of charity.”71 In a modern 
administrative state only a “regime of rights . . . allows refugees to live and reconstruct their 
lives in dignity.”72 The Indian courts have, on occasion, made orders to prevent acts of 
refoulement.
73
 However, as explained by former Chief Justice Verma, “most often these are 
ad hoc orders. And an ad hoc order certainly does not advance the law. It does not form part 
of the law, and it certainly does not make the area clear.”74 
 
3.1 Admission of Tamil Refugees 
 
Of particular interest in the context of refugee admission are the Indian government’s 
long-standing policies with respect to protection of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka.
75
 Tamil 
refugees have fled to India continually (albeit in a series of marked waves following periods 
of deterioration in security conditions in Sri Lanka)
76
 since the beginning of the Sri Lankan 
civil war in 1983.
77
 It is notable that, in contradistinction to “evacuees” from East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh, Sri Lankan arrivals were registered as “refugees” by the Indian 
authorities and initially given access to public health and education services on an equal 
footing with Indian nationals.
78
  
 
The position of Tamil refugees in India changed dramatically following the 1991 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in Sriperumbudur by Thenmozhi “Gayatri” Rajaratnam 
(தேன்ம ொழி "கொயத்ேிரி" ரொசரத்ேினம்), a Tamil suicide bomber with strong links to 
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the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
79
 The Indian intelligence service had provided 
training and material assistance to the LTTE throughout the 1980s.
80
 The deployment of the 
Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka in 1987 and their subsequent involvement 
in actions taken in suppression of the LTTE led to increasing hostility between the LTTE and 
the Indian government.
81
 By the time the IPKF was withdrawn in 1990, having failed to 
disarm either side to the conflict, the Indian intelligence service had lost whatever control 
they once had over the LTTE.
82
 
 
The assassination of Gandhi led to a rise in nationalist sentiment across India and an 
increase in discrimination against Tamils in the country.
83
 This, combined with a wide-spread 
concern in the government with rising levels of Tamil militancy, led to a change in control 
and assistance policies with respect to Tamil refugees. Refugee camps were relocated, social 
and economic services significantly restricted, and special camps for suspected militants 
established.
84
 While the national government did not act to finally prevent the admission of 
Tamil refugees,
85
 in 1992 it introduced a policy of voluntary repatriation, which, in 
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cooperation with UNHCR, ultimately resulted in the repatriation of some 31,062 refugees 
(from an overall caseload in 1991 of 54,199) to Sri Lanka.
86
 This program was discontinued 
in 1995 following an upsurge in violence in Sri Lanka (the Third Eelam War), and a resulting 
increase in the number of Sri Lankans returning to India seeking protection.
87
 For those that 
remain, their displacement in India has now been sufficiently protracted so as to produce a 
significant population of second- and third-generation Tamil refugees. It is commonly 
estimated that over half the refugees currently in the camps in Tamil Nadu were born in 
India.
88
 This has led to calls by some Indian politicians for Sri Lankan refugees to be granted 
Indian citizenship.
89
 The High Court of Madras has now issued notices to both state and 
central governments challenging the continuing denial of citizenship to Tamil refugees in 
India.
90
 
 
3.2 Admission of Tibetan Refugees 
 
Indian policies for the admission and protection of Tibetans have proved remarkably 
similar to those adopted with respect to Sri Lankan Tamils. It is not immediately obvious, in 
the absence of domestic legislation regulating the terms of refugee status in India, why this 
might be the case. There are no clear ethnic affinities between Tibetans and Indians akin to 
those shared between Tamils in Sri Lanka and Southern India. Nor did India have strategic 
commitments in Tibet like those pursued by the Indian government in Sri Lanka throughout 
the 1980s. 
 
The border between India and China remains disputed.
91
 China claims more than 
90,000 square kilometres of Arunachal Pradesh, while India claims approximately 38,000 
square kilometres of the Aksai Chin plateau.
92
 The disputed territories all lie on the border 
between India and China/Tibet, and it is plain that India has keen strategic interests in this 
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area.
93
 However, it is difficult to see how India’s continuing support for Tibetan exiles serves 
to facilitate its own territorial claims. In fact, India’s decision to grant asylum to the Dalai 
Lama in 1959 significantly increased tensions between India and China, and almost certainly 
contributed to the causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
94
 The long-standing presence of the 
Tibetan government-in-exile, the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), in India is a 
continuing source of acrimony between the two states and presents a clear challenge to the 
maintenance of good relations with China.
95
 
 
This apparently quite generous position vis-à-vis Tibetan refugees is particularly 
intriguing given what has, in the past, been quite pragmatic and even hard-nosed language 
adopted by the Indian leadership in respect of this issue. Immediately after the 1959 Tibetan 
uprising, then-Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated that India’s policy with regards to the 
admission and protection of Tibetans would be governed by three factors: the preservation of 
the security of India, India’s wish to maintain good relations with China, and its sympathy for 
the people of Tibet.
96
 Nevertheless, and despite the obvious challenge the presence of Tibetan 
refugees in India presents to relations with China, at no time has India acted to expel Tibetan 
refugees or to close their borders to new arrivals from Tibet.
97
 
 
Like Sri Lankan Tamils, the Indian government considers Tibetans in settlements and 
refugee camps throughout the country to be refugees.
98
 The Indian government previously 
issued entering Tibetans with a Registration Certificate (RC).
99
 This is a legal document 
issued pursuant to the Registration of Foreigners Act 1939
100
 and SRO (Statutory Rules and 
Orders) 1108 of 1950 “Regulating Entry of Tibetan Nationals into India.”101 While not 
explicit in the terms of the order or on the face of the document itself, in practice, the RC 
serves as a de facto residence permit. It entitles Tibetan refugees to rights similar to those of 
an Indian national, save for the right to vote or obtain employment in Indian government 
offices.
102
 This includes the right to work, to start businesses, and to travel abroad and return 
to India.
103
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As of 1994, however, certificates are no longer being issued to so-called newcomers, 
that is, those Tibetans who entered after 1979 when the border between India and China 
became rather more open following the end of the Cultural Revolution.
104
 The government 
appears to make an exception for children born in India to Tibetans who entered prior to 
1979, to whom it continues to issue RCs.
105
 Although Sino-Indian relations improved 
considerably after 1976, when diplomatic relations were resumed between the two 
countries,
106
 access to the RCs does not seem to have been restricted at the behest of the 
Chinese government. This is, rather, the result of an informal agreement between the Indian 
authorities and the Tibetan CTA to encourage newly-arrived Tibetans to return to Tibet. This 
serves to preserve the demographic basis for an autonomous Tibet
107
 while gradually 
reducing those Tibetans officially registered in India as refugees, thereby minimizing an 
important and continuing source of tension with China.
108
 There is, in this respect, a 
convenient overlap between the interests of the Indian government and the CTA with regard 
to the management of newly-arrived Tibetans.  
  
As with the Sri Lankan Tamil population, there have been increasing calls for 
Tibetans long resident in India to be granted citizenship.
109
 This campaign culminated in the 
2010 judgment of the Delhi High Court in Namgyal Dolkar v. Ministry of External Affairs.
110
 
This case concerned an appeal by Ms. Namgyal Dolkar Lhagyari, an ethnic Tibetan born in 
India in 1986, against a decision of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to deny her 
application for an Indian passport on the grounds that she was not a citizen of India.
111
 In 
their judgment, the High Court confirmed that the entitlement to citizenship jus soli pursuant 
to Section 3(1)(a) of the 1955 Citizenship Act
112
 extended to individuals of Tibetan 
extraction. The court quashed the earlier administrative order rejecting Ms. Lhagyari’s 
application for an Indian passport and confirmed her Indian citizenship by declaration.
113
 The 
court was plain in its judgment that its interpretation of Section 3(1)(a) did not displace the 
policy decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs not to grant citizenship by naturalization 
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pursuant to Section 6(1) of the same Act to Tibetans who entered India after March 1959.
114
 
More recently, the government appears to have endorsed a right of naturalization for all 
Tibetans in India.
115
  
 
3.3 Multiple Classes and Qualities of Protection 
 
The resulting picture of refugee admission and protection practices in India is 
complex, inconsistent, and, at times, a rather confusing one. In the absence of a settled 
domestic regime for protecting refugees or determining their status, the standards of 
protection for displaced persons entering India vary wildly depending on their country of 
origin, their place of entry and settlement in India, and their date of arrival in the country. 
Asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, Somalia and Myanmar (both Chin and Rohingya) rely 
almost solely on UNHCR for both legal status and material assistance.
116
 Those that wish to 
seek the assistance of UNHCR must specifically travel to New Delhi in order to contact the 
office there, as the state continues to prevent the agency from operating in most parts of the 
country outside of the capital. In contrast, both Sri Lankan Tamils and Tibetans have long 
been considered refugees by the Indian state.
117
 However, the available protection regime 
will vary considerably even among these comparatively privileged populations. 
 
A few examples will suffice to make the more general point. Tibetans arriving prior to 
1962 were given access to land by the Indian government, typically by way of a long 
renewable lease, in order to establish agricultural settlements.
118
 Tibetans arriving prior to 
1979 and their children received a government Registration Certificate.
119
 Possession of this 
certificate entitles these families to social assistance, including access to medical and 
educational facilities, on an equal basis with Indian nationals.
120
 While the recent case of 
Namgyal Dolkar v. Ministry of External Affairs,
121
 discussed in section 3.2 above, establishes 
the right of ethnic Tibetans born in India to Indian citizenship, by operation of Section 3(1)(a) 
of the 1955 Citizenship Act
122
 this is restricted to those born between 1950 and 1987.
123
 
 
Taking only the example of the protection regime for Tibetans in India, it is evident 
that there are numerous and quite varied classes of protection available within only this one 
refugee population. In this case, the key criterion for determining the standard of protection 
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available, in addition to country of origin, is chronology. The entitlements associated with 
refugee status for Tibetans diminish sharply the later in time one has arrived in the country. 
Refugees arriving prior to 1962 were given access to land, social provision on an equal 
footing with Indian nationals, and the right for their children born in the country to obtain 
Indian citizenship.
124
 Those arriving after 1962 but before 1979 received equal access to 
social provision and the right for their children (if born prior to 1987) to obtain citizenship.
125
 
Those arriving after 1979 receive only a right for their children (if born prior to 1987) to 
obtain citizenship, while those arriving after 1987 receive only their bare refugee status and 
minimal social support.
126
  
 
4. The Relevance of International Human Rights Law 
 
This inconsistency is the result of a domestic refugee policy that is based neither on 
equality of treatment nor legal principle, but on the shifting exigencies of domestic political 
opinion and foreign policy.
127
 The result is a sometimes generous but ultimately inconsistent 
and discriminatory policy that trims refugee policy according to the political interests of the 
Indian government, rather than the most urgent protection needs of asylum-seekers and 
refugees. This is not to say, however, that India has untrammelled discretion with respect to 
their admission and protection policies. While India has not yet acceded to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, it has entered into a series of international agreements, which I will argue now 
very significantly constrains its discretion with respect to the admission and treatment of 
foreign nationals. Chief amongst these is the complex of instruments that now form the 
corpus of international human rights law. India has now signed or ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
128
 the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
129
 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
130
 
and the Convention against Torture (CAT).
131
 Each of these treaties, properly constructed, 
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contains important protections for the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees, and, in 
particular, the right of non-refoulement.
132
  
 
Unlike the 1951 Convention itself, these treaties are principally concerned with the 
rights of individuals who continue to reside in their country of citizenship.
133
 As such, they 
do not explicitly address concerns particular to refugees and asylum-seekers, such as access 
to accelerated naturalization procedures and the need for travel and identity documents.
134
 It 
is plain, however, that the rights they contain are not restricted to state party nationals. Each 
convention contains an express guarantee of non-discrimination that requires states parties to 
ensure the rights they contain to ”all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction . . . without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”135 The 
Human Rights Committee has confirmed that, “the general rule is that each one of the rights 
of the [the ICCPR] must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and 
aliens.”136 It is now well established that this guarantee includes refugees and asylum-
seekers. As explained by the Human Rights Committee in their General Comment 31:  
 
The enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but 
must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, 
such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may 
find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.
137
  
 
It is important to appreciate, however, that non-discrimination guarantees of this type are 
only relevant to the rights contained in the same treaties. They do not guarantee non-
discrimination in respect of benefits or entitlements outside these specific treaty regimes. The 
principle of non-discrimination is somewhat enhanced by the rather more general right of 
equal protection found in Article 26 of the ICCPR. This right guarantees that, “[a]ll persons 
are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of 
the law,”138 and, to this end, it obliges states to “prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to 
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
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birth or other status.”139 This guarantee is not limited to the rights contained in the ICCPR, 
but operates to “prohibit discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected 
by public authorities.”140 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the Article 26 right as a simple guarantee 
of equal protection or, indeed, substantive equality. It is a rather more specific entitlement to 
equal interpretation and application of the laws. It is, in effect, a guarantee of non-
arbitrariness.
141
 The test applied by the Human Rights Committee is not simply equal 
treatment, but whether any differential treatment by the state is “reasonable and objective” in 
the circumstances. As the Committee explained in Broeks v. Netherlands, “[t]he right to 
equality before the law and to equal protection of the law without any discrimination does not 
make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and 
objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of Article 
26.”142 As such, the test is closely related to the so-called rational basis or ordinary scrutiny 
test used by the US Supreme Court when applying the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment
143
 to non-suspect classifications.
144
  
 
While the degree to which the Committee will permit classifications on the basis of 
citizenship remains unclear,
145
 in practice, the application of this standard has been highly 
deferential.
146
 In the view of Hathaway, “the Committee has too frequently been prepared to 
recognize differentiation on the basis of certain categories, including non-citizenship, as 
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presumptively reasonable.”147 Indeed, it seems that the treaty drafters expressly anticipated at 
least some degree of differentiation on the basis of citizenship. While the drafting committee 
rejected an early proposal to restrict the operation of Article 26 to citizens,
148
 their agreement 
on this point seems to have been premised on the assumption that discrimination between 
citizens and aliens would sometimes be justified.
149
  
 
4.1 Article 5 and Inclusive Effect 
 
Even if India were eventually to accede to the 1951 Convention, it would be quite 
wrong to regard the normative regimes established by the 1951 Convention and the wide 
range of instruments that now comprise international human rights law as exclusive to one 
another. Article 5 of that Convention expressly preserves the effect of other “rights and 
benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention.”150 Its effect, 
in short, is to keep the 1951 Convention regime as a body of minimum rights.
151
 Nothing in it 
should be read to take away or derogate from any further or better rights that may accrue to 
the refugee under alternative regimes, regardless of whether these are international or 
domestic in origin.
152
 
 
The travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Convention indicate that Article 5 was included 
to preserve the more generous practices that had been voluntarily adopted by some states 
prior to the settlement of the Convention itself.
153
 There is nothing to indicate that the drafters 
had anticipated the degree to which such rights would develop under the operation of modern 
international human rights law.
154
 However, the 1951 Convention was only the second 
human rights treaty to be adopted by the United Nations,
155
 and it would be anachronistic to 
expect that its provisions explicitly anticipated the development of the law in this area. It 
would be equally misguided to restrict the operation of this Article only to those rights and 
benefits that accrued prior to 1951. The ordinary meaning of this Article is to preserve all 
“rights and benefits granted by a Contracting State,” and this certainly includes those rights 
relevant to refugees and asylum-seekers at contemporary international law.
156
 This is 
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particularly true in light of the object and purpose of the treaty, which, as explained in its 
preambulatory clause, is “to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these 
fundamental rights and freedoms.”157 
 
4.2 Key Exceptions to Human Rights Protection for Aliens 
 
There are, of course, some clear exceptions to the protection of aliens under 
international human rights law. The operation of Article 25 of the ICCPR, which guarantees 
the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote and run for election, and to enter 
the public service, is expressly restricted to citizens only.
158
 Rather more seriously, in time of 
public emergency states parties are empowered by Article 4 of the ICCPR to withdraw all but 
the most fundamental rights from aliens within its jurisdiction.
159
 The Article itself states that 
such measures must not “involve discrimination.”160 However, the ground of national origin, 
which appears in the general Article 2 guarantee against non-discrimination, is omitted from 
the list of grounds relevant to the operation of Article 4 emergency derogations.
161
 
 
The exception with perhaps the greatest significance for the Indian state is found in 
Article 2(3) of the ICESCR. The ICESCR contains a general guarantee of non-discrimination 
in terms that are virtually identical to those found in Article 2 of the ICCPR.
162
 However, 
Article 2(3) contains an express exception to this for developing countries who may 
“determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the 
present Covenant to non-nationals.’163 There is no one definition of the term “developing 
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country,”164 and the term itself has come under significant criticism in recent years.165 The 
World Bank, however, continues to classify India as a developing country with a “lower 
middle income economy,”166 and India continues to be classified as a developing country by 
most states with “high income economies” for the purposes of international aid.167 As such, it 
is reasonably plain that this exception will continue to be relevant to India for at least the 
immediate future.  
 
5. The Expanding Breadth of Non-Refoulement  
 
The practical effect of the human rights treaty regimes to which India is a signatory or 
party will, to a large extent, depend on the precise contours of the various domestic protection 
regimes as they already apply in India, and the manner in which norms at the international 
and domestic level interact on a case-by-case basis. Of fundamental importance, however, to 
all persons displaced to India is the basic principle of non-refoulement.
168
 The centrality of 
this principle for the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers has been repeatedly affirmed 
by the UNHCR ExCom,
169
 the UN General Assembly,
170
 the most learned writers in this 
field,
171
 and, recently, all states parties to the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 
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Protocol.
172
 Before any other rights can become relevant, refugees and asylum-seekers must 
be granted admission to the territory of an asylum state and be assured of their right to remain 
there.
173
 As an injunction framed in “negative terms,”174 the right of non-refoulement cannot 
provide a right of entry per se.
175
 However, as admission to the territory of the asylum State 
will, in practice, often be the only way to avoid returning an asylum-seeker to a country 
where they have reason to fear serious mistreatment, it will frequently amount to a de facto 
right of admission.
176
 
 
Any discussion of the principle of non-refoulement under international law must 
begin with Article 33 of the 1951 Convention.
177
 It is now plain, however, that this principle 
has expanded significantly beyond the terms of the Refugee Convention itself to draw on 
elements of international and regional human rights law and customary international law.
178
 
This is of particular importance where individuals seeking protection fall outside the refugee 
definition in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Geneva Convention and so are unable to avail 
themselves of the right of non-refoulement in Article 33. Where, for example, the persecution 
they fear is not for one of the five Convention grounds (race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or particular social group), a claimant will lack the so-called persecution nexus 
essential to making out a claim to refugee status under the Convention.
179
 As such, they 
would be unable to avail themselves of protection from refoulement under Article 33. This 
would be so, regardless of whether they continue to have a well-founded fear of persecution 
for other, non-Convention grounds. In this case, protection from refoulement under general 
international law or complementary protection will be the key device for ensuring their 
safety.
180
 Insofar as the various elements of complementary protection provide protection 
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from refoulement outside the 1951 Geneva Convention, this should also be the first point of 
reference for the protection of forced migrants in states, like India, that are not yet parties to 
the Refugee Convention.  
 
5.1 Non-Refoulement under the ICCPR  
 
The ICCPR, to which India has been a party since 1979,
181
 contains absolute and non-
derogable guarantees against the arbitrary deprivation of life
182
 and torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment.
183
 Although the ICCPR does not have an express guarantee against 
refoulement akin to Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention or Article 3 of the CAT, the 
Human Rights Committee has subsequently found a right of non-refoulement to be implicit in 
its provisions
184
 where individuals face a “real risk”185 of their rights under the ICCPR being 
violated upon return to another country.
186
 The vast majority of claims in respect of forced 
removal have been brought under Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention
187
 and, initially, the 
jurisprudence of the Committee was only concerned with preventing forced removals in 
respect of these grounds.
188
 However, the Committee now seems to have accepted as a matter 
of principle that removal to a situation where there is a real risk that any of the rights in the 
ICCPR will be violated will amount to refoulement for the purposes of the Convention. As 
the Committee explained in the case of ARJ v. Australia:  
 
If a State party deports a person within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
in such circumstances that as a result, there is a real risk that his or her rights 
under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, that State party itself 
may be in violation of the Covenant.
189
 
 
In their most recent General Comment on this issue, the Committee concluded that  
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the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the 
Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control 
entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person 
from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is 
a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the 
Covenant either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any 
country to which the person may subsequently be removed.
190
 
 
It is significant to note that Articles 6 and 7 are included here only as two examples (“such 
as”) of possible violations and not as a complete list of potential grounds. In consequence, 
states parties now have a basic obligation of due diligence to ensure that individuals facing 
removal from their territory will not be subject to a violation of their rights under the ICCPR 
as a whole.
191
  
 
5.2 Non-Refoulement under the ICESCR 
 
The ICESCR, to which India has been party since 1979,
192
 is frequently dismissed as 
a source of protection from refoulement,
193
 in large part due to the progressive nature of its 
enforcement as described in Article 2(1) of the Convention:  
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.
194
 
 
There is no question that the novelty of the formulation in Article 2(1) has attracted the bulk 
of scholarly attention. Nevertheless, undue attention to the progressive nature of 
implementation under the ICESCR has served to confuse the true nature of state obligations 
under the Covenant. Properly understood, the Covenant has numerous elements that are 
immediately binding on states, that are justiciable in a similar manner and to the same degree 
as provisions of the ICCPR, and that impose obligations of non-refoulement on the same 
terms.
195
 Indeed, there are a number of provisions in the Covenant which are drafted so as to 
be immediately binding on states in their own terms and do not admit of progressive 
implementation.
196
 These include the obligation to ensure equality between men and 
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women,
197
 including equal pay,
198
 the right to form trade unions and to take collective 
action,
199
 the protection of children from exploitation,
200
 free primary education,
201
 and the 
freedom of parents to choose their preferred model of education for their children.
202
 
 
Moreover, it is plain that the enforcement provisions of the Covenant are themselves 
drafted so as to impose immediate obligations on states. While Article 2(1) commits states to 
“achieving progressively” the rights in the Convention, it also requires states to “take steps” 
to begin doing so immediately upon their accession to the Convention.
203
 As explained by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its General Comment 3: 
 
while the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, 
steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the 
Covenant's entry into force for the States concerned. Such steps should be 
deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the 
obligations recognized in the Covenant.
204
 
 
                                               
197
 ICESCR, supra note 135, art. 3 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present 
Covenant.”). 
198
 ICESCR, supra note 135, art. 7(a)(i) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: (a) 
Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work 
of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not 
inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work.”). 
199
 Id. art. 8(1) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: (a) The right of everyone to 
form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, 
for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (b) The 
right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of the latter to form or join 
international trade-union organizations; (c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations 
other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (d) The right to strike, 
provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.”). 
200
 Id. art. 10(3) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that: 3. Special measures of protection 
and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for 
reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from economic and 
social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to 
hamper their normal development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which 
the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.”). 
201
 Id. art. 13(2) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full 
realization of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all.”). 
202
 Id. art. 13(3) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents 
and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the 
public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by 
the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.”). 
203
 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray describe this as “the Covenant’s foundational obligation.” BEN SAUL, DAVID 
KINLEY & JACQUELINE MOWBRAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 137 (2014). 
204
 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties' 
Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), in U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 83, para. 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1990/8 (1991) [hereinafter General Comment 3]. 
28 
The Committee has made clear that “even where the available resources are demonstrably 
inadequate,”205 the states party has an immediate obligation to evaluate the current extent of 
provision and to both plan and implement sensible programs aimed at their substantive 
fulfilment.
206
 The “progressive” nature of this obligation carries with it a strong presumption 
against backward or regressive measures.
207
 
 
In addition, the Committee has now made clear that states parties have an immediate 
obligation to ensure the provision of a “minimum core” of each Convention right.208 As it 
explains in its General Comment 3, 
 
a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State 
party . . . If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a 
minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être.
209
  
 
The immediate obligation of minimum core provision relates to the overall fulfilment of each 
right to at least a minimal level, regardless of the various and contingent state duties this 
might entail.
210
 Moreover, underlying every right is a three-part typology of state duties: to 
respect, protect, and fulfil each right.
211
 This typology is now widely accepted throughout the 
UN human rights machinery as an essential analytical framework through which the human 
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rights obligations of states can be identified and described.
212
 The most basic duty of 
“respect” is an immediate obligation on states to refrain from interfering with access to social 
provision.
213
 As such, there is an immediate duty on states (“to respect”) that applies in 
regard to every element of the ICESCR, even those that are subject to progressive 
implementation.  
 
Finally, all rights contained in the Covenant are subject to an immediate obligation of 
non-discrimination.
214
 Craven has described this principle as the “dominant single theme of 
the Covenant,”215 and it is true to say that elements of it are woven throughout its preamble 
and substantive articles.
216
 However, this principle finds its most distinctive expression in 
Article 2(2), which introduces an independent right of non-discrimination.
217
 Following the 
entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR on 5 May 2013, complaints can now 
be made directly with respect to violations of this Article.
218
 The Committee has not yet 
issued any decisions pursuant to complaints made under the new Optional Protocol. 
However, the issue of discrimination with respect to access to social provision has already 
been extensively litigated at the international level,
219
 with the guarantee against non-
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR in particular providing a platform for such claims 
before the Human Rights Committee.
220
 
 
While Article 2(1) of the Covenant is most readily associated with the principle of 
progressive realization, the frequent and undue focus on this principle alone has done a 
disservice to the underlying complexity and practical relevance of the Covenant as a 
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whole.
221
 Properly constructed, the ICESCR contains multiple obligations that are both 
readily enforceable and justiciable on terms similar to the ICCPR.
222
 In itself, this should not 
come as a surprise. The equal and indivisible nature of all human rights has long been 
acknowledged in international law.
223
 The implications for the protection of refugees and 
asylum-seekers are, nevertheless, striking. Although, in contrast to the Human Rights 
Committee,
224
 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not yet addressed 
the issue of refoulement, there is every reason in both principal and law to assume and expect 
them to infer an obligation of non-refoulement from the ICESCR on similar terms. 
 
5.3 Non-Refoulement under the CRC 
 
The position is considerably more straightforward under the CRC, to which India has 
been a party since 1992.
225
 The enforcement of the rights found in the CRC is not subject to 
progressive realization,
226
 and the Committee on the Rights of the Child has now issued 
authoritative guidance with respect to the principle of non-refoulement as it applies to the 
Convention.
227
 As the Committee explains in its General Comment 6,  
 
States shall not return a child to a country where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the child, such as, but by 
no means limited to, those contemplated under articles 6 and 37 of the 
Convention, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any 
country to which the child may subsequently be removed.
228
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It is significant that, while the comment singles out Articles 6
229
 and 37
230
 as examples of 
harm that would attract protection from refoulement, the terms of this guarantee as expressed 
here are “by no means limited to” these particular rights. The Convention itself is notable for 
embracing the breadth of civil and political, and social and economic rights on equal terms.
231
 
So, and to take the example used by the Committee, while Article 6(1) of the CRC guarantees 
the right to life in terms that are quite similar to Article 6 of the ICCPR, it goes considerably 
further in Article 6(2) by obliging states parties to ”ensure to the maximum extent possible 
the survival and development of the child.”232 
 
It is plain, therefore, that protection from refoulement under the CRC relates to the 
entirety of the Convention.
233
 Any forced return of a child to another country where, for 
example, they will be unable to access healthcare services
234
 or primary education,
235
 be 
subject to forced recruitment,
236
 or go without state protection from sexual abuse,
237
 may 
amount to an unlawful refoulement in violation of the Convention. The breadth of the rights 
concerned are reflected in the terms of the non-refoulement guarantee as described in General 
Comment 6. As the Committee explains,  
 
The assessment of the risk of such serious violations should be conducted in an 
age and gender-sensitive manner and should, for example, take into account the 
particularly serious consequences for children of the insufficient provision of food 
or health services.
238
 
 
It is notable that the Committee emphasizes the “particularly serious consequences” to 
children of denying them access to nutrition and healthcare. This is significant for the right of 
non-refoulement in a wide variety of contexts, as it always requires states to assess the 
seriousness of any potential violation alongside the likelihood of its occurrence.
239
 The 
violation of some rights, such as the right to life, will, by their very nature, always rise to the 
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relevant level of seriousness. Others, such as the rights to education or healthcare, will 
inevitably admit of a much broader spectrum of potential violations. The emphasis of the 
Committee on the particularly serious consequences of violations for children “establishes a 
much lower threshold at which failure to fulfil economic and social rights can play a factor in 
triggering protection through non-refoulement provisions.”240  
 
Finally, it should be emphasized that there is no equivalent in the CRC to the 
exception for developing countries found in Article 2(3) of the ICESCR.
241
 As such, India is 
bound by the provisions of the Convention on the same terms and to the same degree as all 
other states parties. It is notable that the Indian Supreme Court has already acted to ensure 
primary education to the age of fourteen,
242
 to prevent children from working in hazardous 
industries,
243
 and to regulate inter-country adoption.
244
 
 
5.4 Non-Refoulement under the CAT 
 
As distinct from the ICCPR and the CRC, to which a right of non-refoulement has 
been implied by their respective committees, the Convention against Torture (CAT) contains 
an express prohibition of refoulement in its Article 3.
245
 It thus forms a parallel with the right 
of non-refoulement as found in Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, with the very 
significant difference that the guarantee in Article 3 of the CAT, unlike Article 33, is an 
absolute right unconstrained by exclusion provisions like those found in the Refugee 
Convention.
246
 
 
However, while the guarantees found in the ICCPR and CRC now relate to all rights 
found in each convention, the express guarantee in Article 3 relates only to torture as defined 
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in Article 1(1)
247
 of the CAT.
248
 As such, and unlike the rather more general guarantees 
against serious mistreatment found in, for example, Article 7 of the ICCPR
249
 or Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
250
 the guarantee found in Article 3 of 
the CAT is circumscribed in a number of quite specific ways. The operation of this Article is 
limited to preventing removal to a jurisdiction where there are “substantial grounds for 
believing”251 that an individual will fear “severe pain or suffering”252 that is “intentionally 
inflicted” for such purposes as “obtaining from him . . . information or a confession” or 
“intimidating or coercing him,”253 and where the mistreatment is inflicted “by . . . or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official.”254 
 
Despite what might, at first blush, seem an unduly restrictive nature of this definition, 
the Article 3 guarantee has played a significant role in the development of the right against 
non-refoulement.
255
 The great majority of the individual cases dealt with by the Committee 
against Torture now address claims made pursuant to Article 3,
256
 and the Committee has 
upheld such claims and acted to prevent the removal of the individuals concerned on 
numerous occasions.
257
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5.4.1 The Continuing Relevance of the CAT to India 
 
Despite becoming a signatory in 1997, India has not yet acceded to the CAT.
258
 It 
may be tempting to conclude, therefore, that the CAT remains irrelevant to India for the 
purposes of international law. This conclusion would be premature. Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that:  
 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose 
of a treaty when: a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments 
constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall 
have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty;
259
 
 
Although fourteen years have now elapsed since India became a signatory to the 
convention, it continues to actively debate ratification.
260
 As recently as 2010, a bill was 
introduced to the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament) for the purpose of 
ratifying the convention.
261
 Although passage of the bill seems to have been delayed 
indefinitely following its referral to a Select Committee of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house 
of the Indian Parliament) for revision,
262
 it is plain that India has not yet “made its intention 
clear not to become a party to the treaty.” As such, India remains obliged not to act in a 
manner that would “defeat the object and purpose” of the CAT.  
 
It is important not to exaggerate the effect of Article 18. It is obviously wrong to 
suggest, for example, that by virtue of Article 18 a signatory is bound to comply with a treaty 
in the same way as a state party.
263
 The effect of such an interpretation would be to render the 
act of ratification itself redundant and Article 28 of the Convention meaningless.
264
 Nor does 
the mere act of signing a treaty with a “simple signature”265 oblige a state eventually to ratify 
it.
266
 There is virtually no state practice on the implementation of Article 18,
267
 and the 
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process of assessing the object and purpose of a treaty brings with it an “inevitable margin of 
subjectivity”268 that makes it difficult to assess the boundaries of state obligation with any 
degree of certainty.  
 
Nevertheless, it would be equally wrong to dismiss the effect of Article 18 altogether. 
The obligation of states not to act to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty once they have 
signed it is a basic corollary of the obligation to act in good faith (pacta sunt servanda).
269
 It 
appears to have been the view of the International Law Commission that the obligation in 
Article 18 was, at the time the Vienna Convention was drafted, already an element of 
international custom. As the Commission explained in its Commentary to the Draft Articles 
on the Law of Treaties, “an obligation of good faith to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate 
the objects of the treaty attaches to a State which has signed a treaty subject to ratification 
appears to be generally accepted.”270 While the position prior to the Vienna Convention 
remains controversial among some writers,
271
 it is now widely accepted that this rule 
crystallized into a rule of customary international law following its incorporation into Article 
18.
272
 The limited state practice following the adoption of the Vienna Convention appears to 
support this view.
273
 
 
Moreover, there is now a very considerable degree of consensus among writers on the 
meaning of the rule in Article 18.
274
 Most writers agree that, while Article 18 does not require 
signatories to refrain from all conduct that would be prohibited by the treaty once in force, it 
does require states to refrain from conduct that would frustrate the basic premises of the 
treaty.
275
 As Aust explains, 
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36 
 
if the treaty obligations are premised on the status quo at the time of signature, 
doing something before entry into force which alters the status quo in a way 
which would prevent the state from performing the treaty would be a breach of 
the article.
276
 
 
Common examples of such conduct include: a state acting to destroy or alienate unique items 
of property or land prior to a treaty that requires its exchange or return entering into force; 
destruction or obstruction of a navigable waterway prior to a treaty entering into force that 
grant rights of navigation to the other party; and the dramatic increase of tariffs, armaments 
or fortifications prior to a treaty entering into force that would require their reduction by a set 
proportion.
277
 In each case, the actions of the state do not simply violate the convention, but 
serve to undermine the basis on which the parties reached an agreement.  
 
For example, in the oft-cited case of Megalidis v. Turkey,
278
 the Turkish-Greek Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal found invalid the seizure of a Greek national’s property by the Turkish 
authorities in advance of the Treaty of Lausanne entering into force.
279
 It is not simply that 
this would be a violation of the treaty once in force, but that it would “impair the operation of 
its clauses,”280 the most important of which were concerned with partitioning and re-
allocating land from the Anatolian and East Thracian parts of the former Ottoman Empire.
281
 
By seizing land in advance, the Turkish authorities had acted to undermine the basis on 
which the new land settlement had been agreed. Returns that would amount to a violation of 
Article 3 of the CAT, were it in force, are directly analogous with these paradigmatic cases. 
Removing someone from the jurisdiction of a signatory state serves to put them beyond the 
protection of the eventual treaty regime. Doing so disrupts the status quo on which the terms 
of the treaty itself were settled, in much the same way as the destruction or alienation of 
unique property or land serves to undermine the basis on which a treaty concerned with their 
allocation was settled. Individuals are no more fungible than cultural property or land, and 
their losses, as a result of the pain and humiliation they experience through torture, are no 
more easily restored. In each case, the subject of the treaty’s intended governance is removed 
from the jurisdiction of the signatory state in a way that means the terms of the treaty, as 
understood at the time of its settlement, can no longer be entirely fulfilled.  
 
While the identification of the “object and purpose” of a treaty continues to be a 
source of rich scholarly debate,
282
 its challenges should also not be over-stated. The 
International Law Commission has now given substantive guidance as to the interpretation of 
the object and purpose of a treaty in its 2011 Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties.
283
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In the present instance, given the specific and clearly stated purpose of the Convention as 
expressed in its title and preamble,
284
 and the express nature of the injunction in Article 3, it 
would seem difficult to conclude otherwise than that the obligation of non-return is an 
essential object and purpose of the Convention.  
 
There is one potential objection to this approach that should be aired before 
proceeding further. It might be suggested that the relevant status quo as it relates to 
signatories to the Convention is not concerned with the presence or absence of individuals to 
be protected by the resulting treaty regime, but with the policies of the signatory state. The 
argument would be that as long as the policies themselves have not changed, then the 
signatory state has not acted in a manner contrary to the object and purposes of the 
Convention. It is true that the CAT is unlike a traditional human rights treaty in that it is 
principally concerned with changes to state policy as it relates to, for example, the prevention 
of torture
285
 and the criminalization of associated conduct.
286
 Nevertheless, the Convention 
itself is not solely concerned with common state policy. It contains important individual 
rights, and this is in keeping with its stated aims.
287
 The presence of the Article 3 right of 
non-return and the resulting determination of individual claims before the Committee Against 
Torture is the best possible evidence of this.
288
  
 
5.5 Non-Refoulement at Customary Law 
 
It is now widely accepted that running alongside the obligations under the 
conventions already discussed is a broad customary norm of non-refoulement.
289
 In 
consequence, even those states that have not yet acceded to a convention that contains a 
                                                                                                                                                  
the treaty, the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion and, where appropriate, the 
subsequent practice agreed upon by the parties.”). 
284
 See, e.g., CAT, supra note 135, pmbl. (“Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.”). 
285
 Id. art. 2. 
286
 Id. art. 4. 
287
 Id. arts. 12–15. 
288
 See supra text accompanying note 257. 
289
 Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Statues of 
Refugees, Dec. 12-13, 2001, pmbl. para. 4, U.N. Doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (Jan. 16, 2002) (“Acknowledging 
the continuing relevance and resilience of this international regime of rights and principles, including at its core 
the principle of non-refoulement, whose applicability is embedded in customary international law.”); No. 6 
(XXVIII) Non-Refoulement (1977), in EXCOM CONCLUSIONS, supra note 169, at 7, para. (a); No. 22 (XXXII) 
Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large Scale Influx (1981), in EXCOM CONCLUSIONS, supra note 
169, at 28, para. II.(A)(2); No. 25 (XXXIII) General (1982), in EXCOM CONCLUSIONS, supra note 169, at 33, 
para. (b); No. 79 (XLVII) General (1996), in EXCOM CONCLUSIONS, supra note 169, at 115, para. (j); No. 81 
(XLVIII) General (1997), in EXCOM CONCLUSIONS, supra note 169, at 121, para. (i); Summary Conclusions: 
The Principle of Non-refoulement, Expert Roundtable, Cambridge, July 2001, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 156, at 178; Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 156, at 147; GOODWIN-
GILL & MCADAM, supra note 168, at 354 (“[T]hough a minority of commentators continue to deny the 
existence of non-refoulement as a principle of customary international law, the general consensus is that it has 
now attained that status. It encompasses non-refoulement to persecution, based on article 33 of the 1951 
Convention, and also to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); ANNE T. 
GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 347 (2010); Nils Coleman, Renewed Review 
of the Status of the Principle of Non-Refoulement as Customary International Law, 5 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L.  
23 (2003). For a clear summary account of UNHCR’s role in developing the principle of non-refoulement as a 
principle of customary international law, see CORINNE LEWIS, UNHCR AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 
124–25 (2012). For a vigorous dissent from the majority position, see James C. Hathaway, Leveraging Asylum, 
45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 503, 506 (2010). 
38 
prohibition of refoulement are bound by this rule.
290
 However, a customary norm will also 
continue to bind states even after they have acceded to a treaty that reflects, either in whole or 
in part, the substance of that norm.
291
 In this case, the conventional and customary norms run 
parallel to one another and, assuming they are not inconsistent,
292
 may be applied in the 
alternative.
293
 Inevitably, the two categories of norms will be closely related, with the 
conventional norms serving as good evidence of the opinio juris of states and, as such, 
playing a key role in the later crystallization of related customary norms.
294
  
 
The most authoritative and widely cited study on this point is the opinion prepared by 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem as part of the 2001 UNHCR Global Consultations.
295
 Lauterpacht 
and Bethlehem concluded that “170 of the 189 members of the UN, or around 90 per cent of 
the membership, are party to one or more conventions which include non-refoulement as an 
essential component.”296 It is significant that these calculations include the wide variety of 
conventions, such as the ICCPR, the CAT, the European Convention on Human Rights,
297
 the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention,
298
 the American Convention on 
Human Rights,
299
 and the Banjul Charter
300
 that make provision for non-refoulement (either 
expressly or as interpreted) outside the strict definition of a refugee in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, and with respect to torture and threats to life.
301
 As such, Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem distinguish between the customary norm against refoulement as it applies in the 
refugee context
302
 and as it applies in the human rights context more generally.
303
 They 
conclude that in the refugee context, the customary norm against refoulement prohibits return 
where there is a real chance of persecution, torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment, or a threat to life, physical integrity, or liberty.
304
 The prohibition of 
refoulement is subject to exceptions on grounds of national security and public safety akin to 
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those found in Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, save where there is risk of 
persecution that equates to or is of equal seriousness with torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment.
305
 Moreover, as the prohibition against torture is 
consistently framed in concert with the injunction against cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment,
306
 all of these elements should be incorporated into a single 
prohibition at customary law.
307
  
 
In the human rights context, the customary prohibition against return is limited to 
situations where there is a real risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.
308
 The customary prohibition of return to situations 
where there is a real risk of torture (whether in the refugee or general human rights context) is 
non-derogable and does not admit of exceptions. This is consistent with both conventional 
practice and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
HRC.
309
 In parallel with the right of non-refoulement as found in the ICCPR, the ICESCR, 
the CRC, and the CAT, the customary norm as it relates to aliens generally (and not 
specifically those individuals seeking or having obtained refugee status) does not require a 
causal nexus to be established between the ill-treatment feared and a particular Convention 
ground, such as race or religion.
310
  
 
In respect to this final category, however, the analysis of Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 
now appears unduly conservative. Human rights law as it relates to the prohibition of 
refoulement has moved on considerably since Lauterpacht and Bethlehem finalized their 
opinion in 2001. Notably, the Human Rights Committee in their General Comment 31 of 
2004 made it clear that the prohibition of forced removal is relevant to all rights in the 
Covenant where there is a risk of “irreparable harm.”311 Equally, the Committee on the 
Rights of Child in their General Comment 6 of 2005 has now made plain their view that 
return should be prohibited wherever there is a violation of a convention right that presents a 
“real risk of irreparable harm,” rather than in respect to any one particular right or category of 
rights.
312
 Other key international human rights bodies, such as the ECtHR, have now made 
orders prohibiting forced removal where the violation concerns apparently derogable rights, 
such as the right to a fair trial,
313
 the right to liberty and security,
314
 and the right to respect 
                                               
305
 Id. para. 218(d). 
306
 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948); ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 6; CRC, supra note 135, art. 37(a); ACHR, supra note 299, art. 
5(2); Banjul Charter, supra note 135, art. 5; ECHR, supra note 135, art. 3. 
307
 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 156, para. 223 (“[T]he evidence points overwhelmingly to a broad 
formulation of the prohibition as including torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
With the exception of the Torture Convention, these elements all appear in human rights instruments of both a 
binding and a non-binding nature as features of a single prohibition.”). 
308
 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 156, para. 251(b). 
309
 ICCPR, supra note 135, arts. 4(2), 5(1); General Comment 20, supra note 188, para. 3; U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment 24: General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or 
Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of 
the Covenant, para. 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994); ECHR, supra note 135, arts. 
15(2), 17; Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, para. 79 (1996); ACHR, supra note 299, art. 
27; CAT, supra note 135, art. 2(2). The Banjul Charter makes no provision for derogations. See generally 
Banjul Charter, supra note 135. 
310
 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
311
 General Comment 31, supra note 137, para. 12. 
312
 General Comment 6, supra note 227, para. 27. 
313
 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 159; Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 113 (1989) (“The right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings, as embodied in Article 
6, holds a prominent place in a democratic society. The Court does not exclude that an issue might exceptionally 
40 
for private and family life.
315
 Perhaps most importantly, the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action (VDPA), agreed by 171 states at the 1993 World Conference on 
Human Rights,
316
 has made clear that:  
 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. 
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.
317
 
 
If we are to take seriously the injunction in the VDPA to treat all human rights as 
“universal,” “indivisible,” and “equal,” it seems manifestly incorrect to enforce one category 
of rights differently and with greater vigor than others. In the refugee context, the right of 
non-refoulement is a specific and individual right grounded in Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention.
318
 By contrast, the right of non-refoulement as it appears in the human rights 
context, with the unique exception of Article 3 of the CAT, has been read into the 
conventions as a technique of enforcement.
319
 In the general human rights context, it is wrong 
as a matter of principle and inconsistent with current state practice to restrict the customary 
norm prohibiting refoulement to situations of torture alone. 
 
The relevant test in such cases is not categorical but qualitative and depends on an 
evaluation of the seriousness of the feared violation in each case. While torture or the 
arbitrary deprivation of life may serve as the paradigmatic examples of violations that rise to 
the requisite level of seriousness, it is inappropriate to restrict the operation of the customary 
norm to these rights alone. As such, the conclusions of Lauterpacht and Bethlehem should 
now be amended. In the general human rights context, return is prohibited where there is a 
real risk of a violation of human rights of seriousness akin (but not limited) to torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and, in particular, where the violation 
feared will cause irreparable harm to the individual concerned.  
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5.6 Non-Refoulement as a Jus Cogens Norm 
 
The breadth of the customary norm prohibiting refoulement in the human rights 
context is particularly significant as there is now substantial state practice in support of it as a 
jus cogens norm.
320
 If it is a norm jus cogens, then the right of non-refoulement, in addition 
to being generally applicable as a norm of customary international law, is also now a 
supervening norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted.
321
 However, 
this claim remains controversial, and it has not yet achieved widespread acceptance among 
academic writers.
322
 The progress of this claim is closely related to the evolving status of 
human rights norms generally and,
323
 in particular, the prohibition of torture, which is now 
well established as a norm jus cogens.
324
 As explained by Orakhelashvili: 
 
The peremptory character of this principle [non-refoulement] is reinforced by its 
inseparable link with the observance of basic human rights such as the right to 
life, freedom from torture and non-discrimination.
325
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Milanovic, in contrast, has warned against the temptation to make an overly neat association 
between these two norms. As he explains: 
 
that the prohibition of torture and (possibly also) inhuman treatment is jus cogens 
does not automatically entail that the non-refoulement obligation arising from this 
prohibition is also jus cogens.
326
  
 
A great deal turns on the precise nature of the relationship between the right of non-
refoulement and the underlying human rights norm referred to by both Orakhelashvili and 
Milanovic. While Orakhelashvili refers to the norms as being “inseperably linked” and 
Milanovic talks about one “arising from” the other, neither phrase is particularly revealing as 
to the exact nature of the relationship each writer wants to convey. If the right of non-
refoulement is merely a procedural corollary of a more general human rights norm, as 
Milanovic seems to suggest, then he is correct in saying that there is no particular reason why 
the status of a particular human right as a norm jus cogens should include or extend to the 
corollary right of non-refoulement. Another alternative, rather more consistent with the 
interpretation of Orakhelashvili, is that there is a de facto relationship between the two 
norms. It might be that as a purely practical matter an act of refoulement will frequently, or 
even inevitably, amount to a violation of the prohibition against torture. 
 
Neither alternative adequately or fully reflects the role that the norm of non-
refoulement plays with respect to, in particular, the right against torture. In state practice,
327
 
and as applied by key international institutions,
328
 the prohibition of refoulement is not 
merely a corollary or adjunct to the right against torture but, rather, is an essential aspect of 
the norm itself.
329
 It is easy to overlook this point because of the way in which the right of 
non-refoulement has now been expanded to address other substantive rights. As already 
discussed, both General Comment 31 of the HRC
330
 and General Comment 6 of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child
331
 relate the obligation of non-refoulement to the wide 
range of rights contained in those conventions. This is a positive and progressive 
development of the law in this area. Nevertheless, this should not distract from the particular 
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and distinctive importance of this norm with respect to the rights against torture and the 
arbitrary deprivation of life. 
 
It is notable that, even in their most recent general comments on non-refoulement, the 
HRC and the Committee on the Rights of the Child rely on torture and the arbitrary 
deprivation of life as their paradigmatic examples of rights whose violation implies an 
obligation of non-return. A similar point could be made with respect to the ECHR. The 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, while certainly not restricted to making orders prohibiting return 
on grounds of torture alone,
332
 has been particularly concerned with returns in violation of 
this right.
333
 Of potentially greatest importance is the CAT itself, which in its Article 3 
uniquely features an explicit and non-derogable right of non-return to situations of torture.
334
 
In each case, the right against refoulement originated and continues to operate largely in 
relation to the right against torture.  
 
Milanovic is correct to say that the prohibition of torture as a jus cogens norm does 
not “automatically” create any further obligation of non-refoulement arising from it as a jus 
cogens norm. However, this mischaracterises the relationship between the two norms. The 
norm of non-refoulement is not merely related to (either “linked” or “arising from”) the 
prohibition of torture, but is part and parcel of it. If the prohibition of refoulement is 
sufficiently grounded in state practice and opinio juris so as to rise to the level of a customary 
international norm, then it must also be a jus cogens norm by virtue of its inclusion as an 
aspect (what I have referred to above as a “technique of enforcement”) of the more general 
jus cogens norm against torture. The alternative is to characterize non-refoulement as a stand-
alone right that is related only to the general legal obligations of States parties, rather than 
any one particular right. This is consistent with the expanding breadth of non-refoulement 
under both the ICCPR and the CRC and is a helpful way of conceptualizing the interaction of 
this right with the other elements of each convention. However, to characterise non-
refoulement with respect to the general obligations of states only and to ignore its particular 
associations with the right against torture is ahistorical and ignores the most important steps 
of its development as a right apart from the Refugee Convention itself.  
 
5.6.1 The Position of the Indian State 
 
The question of whether non-refoulement rises to the level of a jus cogens norm in the 
refugee context is comparatively straight-forward as it applies to India, as the government has 
now made clear its own position in respect of this issue. In 1996, UNHCR ExCom concluded 
that, “the principle of non-refoulement is not subject to derogation.”335 This is particularly 
significant as India became a member of ExCom in 1995 and so was a member of the 
committee during the time that this conclusion was discussed and agreed.
336
 
 
ExCom conclusions are adopted by consensus,
337
 and during the process leading up to 
their adoption member states of the committee have the opportunity to express any 
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reservations in respect of their content.
338
 As such, the conclusions, as eventually adopted, 
can be fairly said to express the settled views of the member States. It is plain, therefore, that 
India has now accepted non-refoulement as a customary norm jus cogens. Even if India had 
sought to repudiate the substance of Conclusion 79 in the past, more than 18 years have now 
elapsed since its adoption. It would be remarkable if India sought to disavow their agreement 
at this very late stage, particularly following a period in which the norm itself has grown 
increasingly entrenched and, indeed, India has not indicated any desire to do so.  
 
 Moreover, even in the absence of India’s own express view with respect to this 
matter, there is now very considerable state practice in support of this proposition.
339
 As such, 
it is now perfectly correct to interpret India’s obligations of non-refoulement with respect to 
situations of persecution; torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or 
a threat to life, physical integrity or liberty as a peremptory norm of international law.
340
 
While the question of the jus cogens status of non-refoulement remains controversial, such an 
interpretation is consistent with India’s own view of its obligations on this point.  
 
6. The Convergence between Human Rights and Refugee Law  
 
As a result of the number and variety of standards that now apply in respect of non-
refoulement in the refugee and human rights contexts, it may appear as if the law in this area 
has now become unduly fragmented. In fact, the expanding breadth of non-refoulement 
within international human rights law is far better understood as a mark of convergence 
between human rights and refugee law proper. This is because of the way in which 
persecution has come to be defined for purposes of international refugee law. 
 
As is frequently noted, the concept of persecution is not defined in the 1951 
Convention itself.
341
 Indeed, it seems likely that the drafters of the Convention intentionally 
left this term undefined, so as to allow for greater flexibility in its application.
342
 
Nevertheless, there is now very considerable state practice (and, within Western Europe and 
North America, virtual consensus
343
) in support of defining persecution with respect to 
violations of international human rights law.
344
 In the neat formula of Zimmerman and 
Mahler, persecution is “the severe violation of human rights accompanied by a failure of the 
State to protect the individual.”345 While it remains true to say that there is “no universally 
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accepted definition of persecution,”346 it is now plain that the so-called human rights 
approach is the altogether dominant one.
347
  
 
Until now I have followed Lauterpacht and Bethlehem in discussing the norm of non-
refoulement quite separately between the refugee law and human rights contexts. In fact, 
however, there is now considerable overlap between these two bodies of law. In Lauterpacht 
and Bethlehem’s account, the norm, as it relates to refugee law, prohibits forced return to 
situations where there is a real risk of persecution, torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment, or a threat to life, physical integrity or liberty.
348
 As is now clear, 
however, the concept of persecution itself should be principally defined in reference to the 
broad corpus of international human rights law.
349
 As a result, violations of general human 
rights norms, assuming they rise to the requisite level of severity, will ground claims of non-
refoulement in both the human rights and refugee law contexts. The essential difference is 
that, in the latter context, claims in respect of non-refoulement based on violations of general 
human rights must pass through the additional gateway of first being recognized as 
persecution, while in a human rights-specific forum, like the ECtHR or the HRC, they can be 
pled directly.  
 
It is certainly possible to describe the principles underlying the concept of persecution 
in general terms.
350
 Nevertheless, only a well-developed body of law can provide individual 
decision makers with the clarity they need to make consistent decisions with respect to 
refugee status and the operation of the norm prohibiting non-refoulement. Moreover, the very 
wide-ranging acceptance of international human norms provides a basis on which consensus 
can be reached as to the meaning of persecution, even in those jurisdictions, like India, that 
have so far been hesitant to engage with the developing state of refugee law around the 
world. As Storey explains: 
 
The human rights approach is the only one that affords a real possibility of 
achieving a common international understanding and so avoids the evidently 
unsatisfactory scenario whereby decision-makers in one country can say 
persecution means one thing and their counterparts in another country can say it 
means another. Only a human rights approach—or more broadly an international 
law approach—affords decision-makers a tangible way of showing that their 
decisions are based on objective criteria.
351
  
 
Despite these attractions, the human rights approach has not been wholly 
uncontroversial. It has faced persistent criticism on the grounds that it unduly restricts the 
meaning of persecution and, in particular, fails to properly accommodate claims based on 
discriminatory or cumulative grounds that would not obviously amount to violations of 
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human rights.
352
 While the UNHCR Refugee Status Determination (RSD) Handbook itself 
defines persecution with respect to “serious violations of human rights,”353 it also makes 
provision for “other prejudicial actions or threats”354 and “various measures not in themselves 
amounting to persecution (e.g., discrimination in different forms).”355 Read in context, these 
further references are plainly intended to extend the definition of persecution beyond 
violations of human rights per se. 
 
However, human rights law has evolved considerably since the RSD Handbook was 
drafted in 1979, and it now comfortably accommodates claims made on cumulative 
grounds.
356
 It is notable that the first attempt to codify the meaning of persecution at the 
international level, the European Union Qualification Directive, makes specific provision for 
acts of persecution where these are “an accumulation of various measures.”357 Article 9(1)a 
of the Directive does refer to persecution as “a severe violation of basic human rights, in 
particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made.”358 However, it is now apparent 
that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regards the reference in 9(1)a to non-
derogable rights as non-exhaustive.
359
 It is relevant as an example against which the severity 
of the measures feared upon return are to be evaluated. It does not operate to restrict the 
grounds of a claim to refugee status (and, by extension, non-return) to violations of only 
those rights in the ECHR that are non-derogable pursuant to Article 15(2) of the 
Convention.
360
 While violations of the non-derogable rights defined in Article 15(2) will 
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always be of sufficient seriousness to rise to the level of persecution within the meaning of 
Article 9 of the EU Qualification Directive, the severity of other violations must be evaluated 
according to the individual circumstances of each case.
361
 In this respect, the approach of the 
Directive closely parallels the approach of the HRC and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child with respect to those violations of each convention that will ground claims to non-
refoulement.  
 
7. Conclusion: the Significance for Indian Law 
 
As should now be evident, even in the absence of accession to the Refugee 
Convention, India’s treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers on its territory and/or in its 
jurisdiction is now very significantly constrained by its obligations at international law. The 
non-refoulement obligation found in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention has been 
supplemented by a wide range of complementary instruments that impose their own 
obligations of non-return. While the CAT is unique in containing an express and non-
derogable obligation of non-return, a similar right has now been read into the ICCPR and the 
CRC by their respective supervising committees.
362
 Both the HRC and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child have now made plain that the right of non-refoulement as found in the 
ICCPR and the CRC relates to the breadth of rights in each convention, and not merely a sub-
set of core or non-derogable rights.
363
  
 
In addition, there is now very considerable state practice in support of a customary 
norm of non-refoulement in the refugee context where there is a real risk of persecution, 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or a threat to life, physical 
integrity or liberty. This is joined to a parallel norm in the human rights context which, 
properly constructed, prohibits return to situations where there is a real risk of a violation of 
human rights reaching a level of seriousness akin (but not limited) to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and, in particular, where the violation feared 
will cause irreparable harm to the individual concerned. It is almost certainly the case that the 
prohibition of return to situations of torture is now itself a norm jus cogens, in large part due 
to its relationship to the more general norm prohibiting torture.
364
 In its capacity as a member 
of ExCom, the Indian state itself has acknowledged the non-derogable nature of the norm 
prohibiting refoulement in the refugee context.  
 
While superficially disparate, the norms prohibiting refoulement in the refugee and 
general human rights contexts collapse into one another by operation of the now-expanded 
definition of persecution. The concept of persecution in the refugee context is properly 
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interpreted as a serious violation of human rights in the absence of effective state protection. 
As a result, a violation of sufficient seriousness to ground a claim of non-return in the human 
rights context (that is, a violation of human rights that is serious to a degree akin to torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), will also ground a claim to non-
refoulement in the refugee context. The increasing convergence of the norms with respect to 
non-refoulement is particularly significant in the Indian context as, in the absence of a 
functioning national refugee regime, classifying individuals for purposes of each category of 
norms inevitably would prove challenging. The determinations made by UNHCR in New 
Delhi cannot serve as an effective guide in this matter, given the degree to which their access 
to refugee populations around the country is limited by the national government.
365
 The 
categories adopted by the state itself remain manifestly inconsistent and do not yet reflect 
either a coherent or principled account of the realistic protection needs of individuals 
displaced to India.
366
  
 
A general rule can be formulated on this basis: India is prohibited from removing, 
rejecting, or otherwise returning individuals to situations where there is a real risk of a 
violation of human rights rising to a level of seriousness akin (but not limited) to torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and, in particular, where the violation 
feared will cause irreparable harm to the individual concerned. This reflects the position at 
both conventional and customary international law as it relates to India. The seriousness of 
the feared violation is to be assessed on an individual basis taking into account all of the 
circumstances relevant to each case, including the cumulative or discriminatory effect of the 
relevant violations. Relevant circumstances include the age, sex, and health of the victim, and 
the particular mental and physical effects of the violations on them. Violations of non-
derogable rights will always be of sufficient seriousness to ground a claim of non-return.  
 
There is a particular irony here. As discussed in section 2 of this paper, India has so 
far failed either to accede to the 1951 Refugee Convention or to introduce a compatible 
domestic regime. In large part, this is the result of persistent objections from the Indian 
security and intelligence community.
367
 There is no question that India faces a complex 
security situation, and the concerns raised by these elements of the state are not trivial.
368
 
Nevertheless, the Refugee Convention is an extremely nuanced document that takes great 
pains to balance the protection needs of individuals fleeing persecution, and the legitimate 
national security concerns and public safety interests of states. It provides for the exclusion 
from refugee status of individuals for whom there are “serious reasons” for considering that 
they are guilty of serious criminal offences under domestic and international law,
369
 and to 
remove protection from refoulement for those individuals that pose a serious threat to the 
receiving state.
370
 Moreover, the protection it grants from refoulement is dependent on the 
highly circumscribed refugee definition in the Convention itself, which requires, among 
several other elements, that any feared persecution relate to one of the five Convention 
grounds (race, religion, political opinion, particular social ground or nationality).
371
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At the same time, India has, through its own state practice in accession to more 
general human rights conventions like the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the CRC, in becoming a 
signatory to CAT, and in its role as a member of the UNHCR ExCom, contributed 
importantly to the development of a far more sweeping and unconditional norm of non-
refoulement. This is now binding on India as a matter of both customary and conventional 
international law. As such, the ongoing national security debate with respect to accession 
now seems both at odds with the core of Indian state practice and otiose to India’s legal 
obligations. This is not to suggest, however, that the clock, as it pertains to the protection of 
displaced persons, can be turned back. Even if India should now accede to the Refugee 
Convention, it would continue to be bound by what I have suggested are substantially broader 
obligations in respect of non-refoulement at general human rights law. It does mean that 
continuing objections to the introduction of a domestic legal regime on the basis of concerns 
for national security or public safety are now redundant.  
 
Of course, the right of non-refoulement itself, while central to the protection of 
refugees and other displaced persons, is not the sum total of rights to which they are entitled. 
While space does not permit a detailed examination of the complex of rights available to 
forced migrants at international human rights law, or their effect on current protection 
standards, certainly it begins with the right of non-discrimination.
372
 At present, however, the 
various different communities of refugees and forced migrants in India receive dramatically 
unequal treatment. While Tibetan refugees arriving prior to 1979 are registered by the state as 
refugees and granted access to public services on virtually equal footing with Indian 
nationals,
373
 ethnic Chin refugees in Mizoram State are virtually ignored by Indian 
authorities.
374
 As national authorities continue to forbid UNHCR to operate in Mizoram state, 
Chin refugees seeking mandate refugee status and material assistance are forced to travel to 
the main UNHCR office in New Delhi. This, in turn, contributes to the rapidly growing 
population of urban refugees in the capital.
375
  
 
In the absence of a national refugee status determination system that is sensibly 
resourced and enshrined in law, India is unable to undertake the type of inquiries necessary to 
establish the protection needs of entering migrants. Neither is it able to take advantage of the 
status determination process to undertake related security and exclusion inquiries on a 
systematic basis. As a result, India simply lacks the type and quality of information it needs 
to control its borders and to comply with its own obligations at international law. Without a 
comprehensive legal regime for the determination and protection of refugees and other forced 
migrants, entry and protection in India is left as a tool of political exigency rather than a 
principled act of state. However generous, it remains a regime of charity rather than one of 
rights and is inconsistent with respect for the dignity of those individuals it seeks to assist. 
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India will remain bound by its obligations with respect to non-refoulement, regardless 
of what legal reforms it undertakes (or fails to undertake) at the domestic level. However, 
only a comprehensive national regime in line with the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and the current demands of international human rights law will allow it to admit and protect 
forced migrants in a manner consistent with its own international obligations, and to a 
standard that reflects its apparent commitment, as a member of UNHCR’s ExCom, to the 
protection of refugees.  
